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The ability to rapidly identify UAS in the field has emerged as a critical need for the integra-
tion of small UASs into the national airspace and counter-uas operations. This paper proposes
an architecture for rapid retrieval of UAS information leveraging NASA’s current Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system. The proposed architecture uti-
lizes UTM components: FIMS (Flight Information Management System), USS (UAS Service
Supplier), and vehicle registration and model database in order to provide assessment of the
UAS reported in the field including the ability to distinguish between participating and non-
participating UTM actors. Detailed system descriptions are provided and preliminary results
from field tests conducted during UTM TCL (Technical Capability Level) 3 are discussed. It
is found that 94% of the remote ID look-ups were successful. The average time of a look-up
is found to be 1.2 seconds. Failure cases are examined and recommendations on next steps to
advance UAS remote identification are provided.
I. Introduction
By 2024, the commercial drone market is estimated to reach 17 billion US dollars [1]. Much of this growth can be
attributed to significant venture capital investment over the last several years coupled with more capable UAS platforms
targeting information and value-add services. Agriculture applications, for example, continue to drive market demand in
the areas of crop monitoring, spraying, and soil and crop health. UAS package delivery is projected to save up to 50
billion US dollars as a result of 50 million drone deliveries per day [2].
With the potential of millions of drones simultaneously accessing the airspace in the near future, there is significant
concern regarding the ability to distinguish participating from non-participating actors in the Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system. There have been increasing reports of criminals and organized crime
leveraging advancements in drone technologies in order to surveil targets [4], deliver contraband to prison inmates [5],
and smuggle narcotics across borders [12]. Recently in Staten Island, NY, a hobbyist UAS unwittingly entered airspace
where a Blackhawk UH-60M assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division was located [15]. The quadrotor collided with the
Blackhawk causing damage to the main rotor blade.
In response to these events, Counter-UAS or C-UAS has emerged as a critical need in both the public and private
sectors [16, 17]. Although legal challenges abound [18], there has been recent venture capital investment in companies
such as Citadel Defense Co. and Securus Technologies [20]. Over 230 counter-UAS products currently exist or are
under development worldwide spanning a range of technologies including radar, active and passive optics, acoustics,
electromagnetic emissions, and magnetic field detection [21] . While counter-UAS technologies continue to make
inroads with respect to detection of one or more vehicles in cluttered environments (for example, an urban setting),
rapid UAS identification and the ability to distinguish participating from non-participating actors in the UTM system
remains a significant challenge. For comprehensive, end-to-end counter-UAS solutions, four components are required
(collectively referred to herein as DIAD and depicted in Fig. 1): (1) Detect UAS; (2) Identify UAS; (3) Assess safety
and risk metrics; (4) Defeat UAS (disable or thwart mission objectives).
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TheDetect block refers to process by which a collection of phenomenological data is acquired by one or more sensors
(active or passive [21]) and processed via sensor fusion or other techniques in order to locate and track a potential drone
as it traverses its flight path. The block labeled Identify, which is the primary focus of this paper, constitutes the point in
the flow where information is gleaned from the detect block and provides registration and/or position information to
a public safety USS (discussed below) to ‘look-up’ or acquire corresponding information in the UTM system. The
information provided by the UTM system could include vehicle performance specifications, past flight data including
detailed trajectory and planning information, current and future flight plan information and owner contact details.
Historical information could be useful in order to predict anomalous behavior. While it is not known the type of
traffic patterns that may emerge∗ as the UTM system unfolds, machine learning techniques could be used to identify in
near real-time unusual flight patterns arising from witting or unwitting actors. For example, package delivery trajectories
may follow relatively predictable patterns given a set of known parameters such as vehicle type, time of year, location,
weather, and other economic metrics. At the same time, delivery routes may be located near assets vulnerable to a
potential UAS threat that would require rapid intervention to defend.
Assessment, the third block, comprises the garnering and processing of all relevant information from the detect and
identify blocks as well as additional information regarding the asset to be protected. Risk metrics are evaluated and
a decision is made as to how to defeat the potential threat, if any. This leads to the Defeat block and its options will
depend on the progression of counter-UAS technologies as well as the rules and regulations that are under consideration
presently. Further discussion of detect, assess, and defeat is beyond the present scope.
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Fig. 1 Detect Identify Assess Defeat (DIAD)
The primary contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) initial architecture for remote ID in the context of the
UTM system, (2) description of the preliminary prototype deployed, and (3) initial assessment of the system used in
UTM TCL3 field tests conducted February through June 2018.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: In Section II, a brief description of the problem and relevant background
information on the NASA UTM project is presented. In Section III, the initial remote ID architecture and scenarios are
discussed. The main results are presented in Section IV and summary in Section V.
II. Background and Previous Results
By 2021, the combined number of commercial and hobbyist UASs could reach 6 million [23]. The scale, type, risk,
and increasing complexity of the potential UAS operations would likely overwhelm the existing Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system. To address this challenge, NASA developed an initial concept termed Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
Traffic Management (UTM) in 2015 [24] which provided a research platform to test and integrate innovative strategies
and solutions. In collaboration with the FAA, UTM has evolved and consists of a suite of services [25] to aid the
management of complex UAS operations in uncontrolled (Class G) airspace. It establishes safe, efficient, and secure
∗Traffic patterns will likely be driven by market need and regulatory requirements which are currently evolving.
2
mechanisms for UAS operators to share flight operation intent and receive common situational awareness. The elements
of UTM consist of: (1) USS (UAS Service Supplier) which is the entity that receives flight operations from a UAS
operator and provides support for deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and communication with FIMS; (2) FIMS
(Flight Information Management System) which is the centralized gateway of information between the USSs and FAA;
(3) SDSP (Supplementary Data Service Supplier) which is the entity that provides data or services to USSs or UAS
operators. Further description of the UTM system and its interplay between ATC services can be found in [25].
In 2018, NASA worked with six test sites to demonstrate UTM Technical Capability Level (TCL) 3 which explored
the following elements: (1) Moderate Population; (2) Moderate Traffic Density; (3) Suburban Applications; (4) Mixed
Operations; (5) Vehicle to Vehicle Communication; (6) Public Safety Operations. The test sites were located in Alaska,
North Dakota, Nevada, New York, Texas, and Virginia.
In support of the UTM project, a vehicle registration and model database, called Vehicle Registration and Model
Database (VRMD). The VRMD enables the storage and retrieval of detailed vehicle-specific information for use in
trajectory performance analysis and potential counter-UAS applications. The total number of manufacturers that
currently exists in the database is 168 and total number of distinct vehicles types (available to select as part of the
registration process) is 474. This includes both publicly available vehicles and custom vehicles (vehicles built or
customized for this test or are otherwise not publicly available). Fig. 2. summarizes the current state of VRMD.
As part of UTM TCL3 field test (across the six test sites), approximately 124 vehicles registered via the NASA
VRMD system. The registered vehicles include vehicles that were reserved for backup and vehicles that failed and
were replaced during the course of preparation for the testing events. Sixteen of the vehicles were used for simulation.
Registration was facilitated by a web-portal made publicly available and partners from the test sites were provided access
through NASA’s access and identity control system. Prior to performing any testing, all vehicles that were anticipated to
fly had to register and provide detailed vehicle model specifications.
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Fig. 2 UTM Vehicle Registration and Model Database (VRMD) Summary. At the time of this writing, the
database contains 474 distinct vehicle types that operators can select from during the registration process. Each
vehicle type has associated with it detailed model specifications which can be queried via the VRMD API.
The process of registering a vehicle involves selecting the vehicle type from a vehicle list (containing the 474 vehicle
types) and entering additional vehicle instance (the realization of a vehicle type) information. Upon its creation, VRMD
issues a universally unique identifier (version 4 UUID), which is used as the UTM Vehicle Identification Number
(UVIN). Binding UVINs to GUFIs (Globally Unique Flight Identifiers) used by USSs enable rapid access to vehicle and
operation specific data for remote ID and other data analyses.
Having discussed the UTM background, the TCL3 testing phase, and the VRMD, the remote ID architecture is now
described.
III. UTM Remote ID System
A. Architecture
The remote ID architecture that was implemented in UTM TCL3 is shown in Fig. 3. The primary objective of the
remote ID concept is to test and validate a list of scenarios where identification of a vehicle is required by an authorized
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Fig. 3 UTM Remote ID Flow Diagram
entity working near the operation. An example of this scenario is when a police officer observes a UAS flying overhead
and requires the following:
1) Identification of the UAS owner and contact
2) Vehicle properties including class (fixed-wing, quad, etc.)
3) Current flight plan, vehicle speed and heading, and future operations
4) UTM state of the corresponding flight plan, e.g. ROGUE, NON-CONFORMING, etc.
Given the above information, the officer may assess the situation and choose the appropriate counter-UAS measure. It is
important to note that a counter-measure might be as simple as contacting the owner/operator and conveying that the
vehicle should not be there. If the owner/operator, ‘turns the vehicle around’ then that mission was effectively ‘defeated’
from the public safety officer’s point of view.
The test sites conducted one or more of the test scenarios discussed below. Each test scenario involves (1) a UAS to
be remotely identified and zero or more UASs nearby that may also be simultaneously broadcasting drone identification
information, (2) a public safety USS, (3) a public safety user who performs the remote UAS identification and validates
the results of the tests, and (4) a USS that receives the original flight plan for the UAS to be identified (note that certain
tests which do not include vehicle registration and/or proper flight plan submission to a USS excluded this component).
A public safety USS is a USS that has been granted by FIMS the PUBLIC_SAFETY role. Bound to this role are a
number of public safety permissions enabling it to request information from other USSs and query VRMD to obtain
detailed vehicle information required for remote ID. A public safety user is a person who is registered with a public
safety USS and has relevant credentials/authorization to communicate with it using a suitable device (tablet, phone, etc)
over the public internet. Test sites determined and provided the appropriate hardware and software for both the UAS to
be identified and the public safety user (the sensors are described in Section IV.
The remote ID system for identifying a UAS is a multi-step process. Also, some specific use cases may not require
each step. The steps are as follows:
Step 1: A UAS is detected by one or more sensors corresponding to the Detect block in Fig. 1. This includes
any additional information such as the broadcast of position and UVIN (registration) data.
Step 2: After acquiring the information, the Vehicle Identification Device (VID)† transmits an HTTP GET
request to a public safety USS.
†In this paper, the device that detects the vehicle and transmits the information to the public safety USS is referred to as the VID. However, in
general this could be any system and need not be a portable device.
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Step 3: If the information received contains a UVIN, the public safety USS requests information from the UTM
Vehicle Registry and Model Database (VRMD). The public safety USS has specialized roles that enable
it to access required vehicle information including make, model, owner contact information, and other
properties.
Step 4: The response from VRMD is also returned indicating whether the vehicle has been found or not and the
additional information required for remote ID.
Step 5: The public safety USS sends a request to the USS Discovery Service. The USS Discovery Service
receives the request and retrieves the ‘owning’ USS instance (highlighted in red in Fig. 3). This request
is based on the UVIN and/or reported 4d position estimate of the UAS as determined by the VID (Detect
block in Fig. 1). An illustration of this process for two overlapping USS instances is shown on the left
side of Fig. 4. A USS instance is a specific realization defined by a bounding rectangle. A USS may
instantiate zero or more USS instances to support its missions.
Step 6: The public safety USS then performs an inquiry to the ‘owning’ USS to retrieve additional information
such as the current flight operation submitted (GUFI), current UTM state, position and velocity of the
UAS (if identified), and future flight operations. Depending on the scenario, the ‘owning’ USS instance
many need to be selected from a list of candidate USS instances. This is illustrated on the right side of
Fig. 4. UTM operation states include states such as ACTIVE,ROGUE, NON-CONFORMING, AND
CLOSED. Further information can be found in [27].
Step 7: The public safety USS assembles all relevant pieces of information and performs Drone Observation
Resolution (DOR) - a process where it provides its ‘best’ estimate of the observed vehicle and its status
with respect to the UTM ecosystem. This could be challenging when there exists multiple overlapping
USSs and multiple operations overlapping in time and space. In addition, position updates and other
messages could be used to fine-tune the estimate.
Step 8: The DOR is assembled and returned to the VID for display to the public safety user.
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Fig. 4 [Left]: Overlapping USS Instances. The UAS location transmitted by the VID is located in a region of
intersection between two USS Instances. Both USS Instance IDs are returned to the public safety USS. [Right]:
VID position reported contained in operation (identified by a GUFI) associated with USS Instance B.
B. Remote ID Test Scenarios
Having described the general flow of information, the remote ID test scenarios that were considered‡ as part of
UTM TCL3 testing are now discussed. As indicated above, not all paths were traversed since some scenarios do not, for
example, involve the broadcast of a UVIN to the VID. When the positions of the vehicle or the VID, are referred to,
WGS-84 [28] is assumed.
Scenario 1: Valid UVIN; flight plan & observation consistent
The UAS transmits a valid UVIN to the VID and its coordinates are also estimated by the VID§. The
‡Not all of these scenarios were fully field tested.
§In the event that the VID is unable to provide an estimate, the position of the VID itself could be used as the best estimate provided the detection
range is small relative to the UAS movement capabilities.
5
public safety USS receives the UVIN and the vehicle coordinates. DOR determines
• UVIN is valid
• Flight plan submitted is consistent with the observation
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety user records results on the
reporting template.
Scenario 2: Valid UVIN; flight plan & observation inconsistent
The UAS transmits a valid UVIN to the VID and its coordinates are also estimated by the VID. The
public safety USS receives the UVIN and vehicle coordinates. DOR determines:
• UVIN is valid
• Flight plan submitted is inconsistent with the observation (for example, a rogue operation)
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety USS user records results on the
reporting template.
Scenario 3: Valid UVIN; no flight plan submitted
The UAS transmits valid UVIN to the VID and its coordinates are also estimated by the VID. The
public safety USS receives the UVIN and vehicle coordinates. DOR determines
• UVIN is valid
• There is no flight plan submitted by the operator of the vehicle with an operating time range
that coincides with the observation time.
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety USS user records the results on
the reporting template.
Scenario 4: Unregistered (or expired) UVIN
The UAS transmits a UVIN to the VID and its coordinates are also estimated by the VID. The public
safety USS receives the UVIN and vehicle coordinates. DOR determines
• There does not exist an entry in the vehicle registration database or that the UVIN has expired
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety USS user records the results on
the reporting template.
Scenario 5: No transmission; valid flight plan
The UAS does not transmit a UVIN to the VID, however, its coordinates are estimated by the VID.
The public safety USS receives the vehicle coordinates. DOR determines
• There exists at least one flight plan that is consistent with the transmitted coordinates.
• There are valid UVINs of the vehicle(s) whose flight plan(s) is (are) consistent with the
observation and notes lack of transmission
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety USS user records the results on
the reporting template.
Scenario 6: No transmission; no flight plan
The UAS does not transmit a UVIN to the VID, however, its coordinates are estimated by the VID.
The public safety USS receives the vehicle coordinates. DOR determines
• There does not exist a flight plan that is consistent with the transmitted coordinates
• This is a non-UTM participating vehicle
The results are packaged and sent back to the VID. The public safety USS user records the results on
the reporting template.
IV. Main Results
In this section, the remote ID tests that were performed as part of UTM TCL3 field testing that occurred during the
February-June 2018 time-frame are discussed. Remote ID tests were performed at the North Dakota, New York, and
Virginia test sites. Data from the NY and ND test sites are presented below.
Fig. 5. summarizes the vehicles that participated, including several performance specifications. Scenarios 1 and 5
described above are reported.
ND Test Site: All remote ID tests occurred at Camp Graphton North located near Devils Lake Municipal Airport
(KDVL). All tests included three vehicles simultaneously operating near one another. Two vehicles (Altavian Nova
F700 and SharperShape A6) always flew as ‘participating’ vehicles, that is, they were registered and filed flight plans
with a USS. One vehicle (Vapor) served as the ‘non-participating’ or intruder vehicle.
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9.72 [kts]
Fig. 5 Remote ID: Vehicle Specifications. A total of five vehicles took part in remote ID test scenarios during
the UTM TCL3 field demonstrations (February-June 2018).
Two remote ID systems were examined, both using µAvionix ADS-B technology. The first was a passive system
where local area receivers were deployed and continually monitored for UVIN and position information transmission.
This system could be deployed to locations where constant surveillance and situational awareness is required. It provides
an additional data and verification layer. For example, if a vehicle unwittingly did not properly file a flight plan but was
able to transmit its UVIN and position information, the system could determine the vehicle type, its properties, and
contact the owner to assess whether or not this constituted a bad actor in the system.
In the second system, a handheld receiver was developed to provide a public safety officer to actively identify a
vehicle. The receiver had internet connectivity and was able to query the public safety USS once UVIN and position
information was received (see Fig. 3). Fig. 6. depicts one of the remote ID test flights that occurred on April 17, 2018
around 14:50 GMT.
NY Test Site: All remote ID flights were conducted at the NY UAS test site at Griffiss International Airport in Rome,
NY. In each test, a DJI S1000 and M100 (see Fig. 5.) equipped with various sensor packages were flown. Three UAS
Remote ID methods were tested: (1) ADS-B (using µAvionix), (2) Secure Integrated C2, and (3) Infrared Light Beacon
Encoding.
In the first method, µAvionix Ping 2020 ADS-B transceivers were installed and programmed to transmit UVIN and
position information over 978MHz. Multiple ground-based ADS-B receivers received the transmission and a smart
phone application was used by the public safety officer to interface with the public safety USS.
The second method, termed secure integrated C2, leveraged the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Host
Identification Protocol (HIP). A primary advantage of HIP is its separation of identity and location as opposed to
traditional TCP/IP architectures which combine them based on IP addresses leading to non-verifiable identities subject
to spoofing and other forms of attack. Instead, identity is established based on 2048-bit RSA public keys [29].
In the third method, infrared light beacons were installed on each UAS and were programmed to transmit UVIN data
at 1Hz. The public safety officers used handheld IR receivers connected to a smart-phone application that interfaces
with the public safety USS. Generally, this technology required the public safety officers to be in closer proximity to the
UAS being identified (see Table 3).
The primary metrics analyzed included detection and look-up latencies as well as the distances from the vehicle to
the vehicle identification device (VID) at times of look-up. Remote ID detection latency is defined as the time duration
(measured in seconds) from the initial detection by the relevant sensor suite to its acquisition of a UVIN, position, or
other information required for a remote ID look-up. In Fig. 3., this is the time duration between steps 1 and 2. Remote
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ID look-up latency is defined as the time duration (measured in seconds) from the initiation of the HTTP request by the
VID to its corresponding HTTP response. In Fig. 3., this is the time duration between steps 2 and 8. A time of look-up
is defined as the time (GMT) that step 2 occurs.
Non-Participating
Vapor 55
Pulse Aerospace
UTM-Participating
A6
Sharper Shape
Public Safety 
Oﬃcer Location
UTM-Participating
NOVA F7200
Altavian
Top View
Remote ID Look-Up
Intruder breaches
A6 geo-fence
Avg. Dist: 179.45 [m]
Avg. Time: 1.13 [s]
Fig. 6 Remote ID Look-Up Test: The blue trajectory depicts the A6 (participating multi-rotor) simulating a
scenario of filming a sporting event. Also depicted in blue is its geo-fence. The Vapor (intruder helicopter),
depicted in red, takes off and breaches the geo-fence of the A6. The public safety officer becomes aware of the
intruder and uses its VID to identify the intruding vehicle. Two look-ups are shown by the white lines indicating
the positions of both vehicle and public safety officer at the times of look-up. The average distance 179.45 [m] and
time 1.13 [s] are computed over all data from the ND test site. Also shown is the Nova (participating fixed-wing)
in yellow.
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Overall, there were a total of three technologies examined in TCL3 Remote ID experiments¶. ADS-B based
technology (using µAvionix hardware) was tested most frequently (generated the highest number of lookup data). The
second was secure C2 and the third was IR-based technology. Fig. 7. depicts this breakdown based on the percentage of
look-ups by technology.
ADS-B (71%)
Secure C2 (24%)
Infrared (5%)
Fig. 7 Detection Technology Breakdown
A total of 12 flights (12 distinct GUFIs) were flown
for remote ID (8 at the NY test site and 4 at the ND
test site) generating a total of 326 look-up data points.
Table 1 shows the minimum, maximum, average, and
standard deviation of the look-up latency times for all
UTM remote ID look-ups. The last column, success
percentage, indicates the percentage of the 326 look-ups
that resulted in a success. A look-up is considered a
success if there are no failures in the system preventing
steps 1 through 8 in Fig. 3. from its completion. For
example, a failure in step 1 could be due to obstruction
from buildings/structures or environmental conditions
such as sunlight, temperature, or humidity impacting the
sensor technology employed. A failure in step 2 could be
due to network failure from the VID to the internet (wifi or LTE signal strength for example). A failure in step 3 could
be due to the unavailability of the vehicle registration service. Of the 326 look-ups, 306 or 93.87 percent resulted in a
Total
Look-ups
Minimum
Latency [s]
Average
Latency [s]
Maximum
Latency [s]
Standard
Deviation
[s]
Success
Percentage
326 0.40 1.20 9.49 0.86 93.87
Table 1 Overall Look-up Latency Metrics. The minimum, maximum, average, and standard deviation of the
latency times for all UTM remote ID look-ups are computed. This included whether or not the look-up resulted
in a successful identification. In the last column the percentage of successful look-ups is reported.
success. 20 look-ups or 6.13 percent resulted in failure. Of the 20 failures there were 4 occurrences in tests that used the
IR technology (see Fig. 7) and 16 occurrences in tests that used the secure C2 technology. Tests using the ADS-B
technology did not result in any failure.
The failures in look-ups in the IR tests (4 out of 16 or 25%) were likely due to either the orientation of the vehicle or
the position of the hand-held IR gun at the time of the look-up. Unlike in the secure C2 and ADS-B approaches, the
public safety officer had to point the IR gun fairly accurately at the moving target for a period of about 0.25 [s] in order
to receive the signal (UVIN data). Similarly, the transmission to the receiver of the light beacon mounted on the bottom
of the vehicle is highly susceptible to aircraft orientation, speed, and environmental factors such as sunlight.
The 16 failures (21%) in the secure C2 tests were likely due to a public safety failure(see step 2 in Fig. 3.) due to an
unanticipated heavy load during those tests. Specifically, this was due to the number of connections to the database
(AWS RDS) that exceeded the allowable limit. Typically, this number is adjusted to optimize database performance. In
addition, optimizing the connection pool maintained by the application could also have impact on performance. After
this problem was identified and parameters were modified, these look-up failures did not persist.
It is found that the average look-up latency time was 1.2 [s] which is reasonable given that the HTTP request must
ultimately traverse several network connections to disparate components (public safety USS, vehicle registration, USS
discovery service, etc.). In addition, each component also has its own database connection which in most cases was
an Amazon Web Service RDS (Relational Database Service). The maximum time was found to be 9.49 [s] which
was likely due to increased traffic on the public safety USS or vehicle registration service and their dependencies. For
example, the vehicle registration service used a third party authentication service that can result in intermittent delays of
several seconds.
¶DSRC was used at the Virginia test site, however, data analysis of those flights are not included in this paper.
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Fig. 8 Look-Up Time Histogram. The average look-up time was 1.2 [s]. The maximum (one occurrence) was
9.4 [s]. The standard deviation was 0.86 [s]. Delays were likely due to increased traffic on the public safety USS
or vehicle registration service and their dependencies.
Minimum
Latency [s]
Average
Latency [s]
Maximum
Latency [s]
Standard
Deviation
[s]
0.001 1.542 5.200 1.120
Table 2 Overall Detect Latency Metrics. The detect latency
is defined by the time elapsed from when the detector acquires
the relevant information to the time it becomes available to the
software component that initiates the look-up.
Its important to distinguish the look-up la-
tency from a failure. The 9.4 [s] latency is
not considered a failure since the information
requested at the time of look-up by the public of-
ficer was ultimately delivered. It is also depicted
in Table 2 the detection latency statistics. This
varied by technology since each one has different
processing steps that enable the information (po-
sition and UVIN) to be processed and properly
formatted for an HTTP request in step 2.
Also of interest is the distribution of distances
from the vehicle to the VID or public safety officer at times of look-up. Overall, 26,588 vehicle position data elements
were collected over 97 min of total flight time and linear interpolation was used to compute the distance from the
vehicles to the public safety officers. Table 3 depicts the quartiles and the minimum and maximum statistics for the
distances (in meters) based on the technology. The IR technology had the lowest range since the receiver had to be in
closer proximity to the vehicle in order to obtain a detection.
Technology Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
ADS-B 45.81 59.47 82.50 141.82 194.73
Infrared 54.52 57.33 66.72 73.18 84.24
Secure C2 48.18 57.96 88.78 111.70 163.95
Table 3 Distance at Times of Look-Up by Technology [m]
To summarize the results, there were a to-
tal of 12 flights, 326 look-up data points and a
94% success rate. The sensor technologies used
had a significant impact on the data and success
rate. For example, while the IR technology ap-
proach is promising, further research is needed
regarding its detection range, susceptibility to
environment factors, and vehicle orientation (Eu-
ler angles) and speed during a particular mission.
In addition, if the public safety officer is required
to manage simultaneously two different devices (one for detection and one for interfacing with the public safety USS)
this may impact the failure rate adversely especially when pointing accuracy is required. ADS-B technologies had the
highest percent success rate, highest number of look-up tests, and the highest range (maximum distance) from the public
safety officer at the time of look-up. This is likely due to the maturity of the technology (for example, the IR and secure
C2 approaches was custom built specific to this test) and its general widespread familiarity.
While this analysis represents an important first step in remote ID using the UTM system, it is recommended
that future remote ID experiments break the experiment into more focused subsets in order to analyze separately the
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individual components. This includes sensor technologies, communication protocols, and the various s/w and network
components that comprise Fig. 3.
V. Summary
This paper discussed the UTM remote ID framework and examined initial data collected during the UTM TCL3 field
tests that were conducted February through June 2018. The proposed architecture utilized UTM components: FIMS
(Flight Information Management System), USS (UAS Service Supplier), and vehicle registration and model database in
order to provide assessment of the UAS reported in the field including the ability to distinguish between participating
and non-participating UTM actors. Detailed system descriptions were provided and preliminary results from field tests
were discussed. This included an analysis of the detect and look-up latencies and distances between the vehicles to
be identified and the public safety officers. Future work should focus on (1) developing requirements for the latency
metrics measured in this study which may depend on numerous factors including risk, geographic location, population
density, etc., (2) the emerging technologies that enable remote identification of vehicles at longer distances, and (3) a
more comprehensive and thorough analysis of the various UTM components and their network interconnections that
play a critical role in remote ID.
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